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Petitioner  submits this reply memorandum in further support of her Article 
78 Petition to set aside the April 20, 2017 denial of her parole application by Respondent Parole 
Board of New York, as arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Much like the Parole Board’s decision in this case, Respondent’s brief relies on the 
articulation of generic legal principles to argue that so long as it utters a few “magic words,” its 
discretion cannot be challenged and its decisions are unreviewable.  At the same time, 
Respondent argues that significant statutory reforms to make parole forward-looking had no 
impact on its authority, and again claims that by merely mentioning that it looked at Ms.  
objective, evidence-based COMPAS risk assessment, the Board need not give any credence or 
effect to its conclusions.   
Moreover, although it admits that Ms.  is entirely rehabilitated and poses no threat 
to society, the Board nonetheless denied parole based solely on the seriousness of the crime 
committed in 1981.  Respondent now hopes to sustain that decision by arguing that because the 
Board simply used the words “deprecate the seriousness of the offense” and “undermine respect 
for the law,” its lack of analysis or meaningful consideration of the other statutory factors makes 
no difference.  That is not the law, and the Board’s improper decision should be vacated.   
The Parole Board’s denial of Ms.  application for release is also unlawful because 
the Board continually denied Ms.  access to the record of her case, to which she has an 
undisputed statutory right.  Respondent’s claims, that it is the wrong agency to provide the 
record of its own proceedings, and that a narrow exception justifies the blanket withholding of all 
documents, are overbroad and lack support in fact or law.   








I. The Parole Board’s Denial of Ms. Application Was An Abuse of Discretion 
Although the Parole Board is granted significant discretion to carry out its duties, that 
discretion is not unfettered; it must be exercised within the confines of the law.  Respondent 
argues that the mere mention of the required statutory factors satisfies this obligation and 
insulates the Board’s decision from meaningful review.  That is not the law. 
A. The Board Did Not Conduct The Forward-Looking Assessment Required By Law 
The first basis for setting aside Respondent’s decision is that it is based on an error of 
law.  Parole decisions must be made based on a forward-looking assessment; who the parole 
applicant is today—not who the person was when the crime was committed.    
When the modern Parole Board was first established approximately 40 years ago, its 
review focused on an evaluation of the nature of an offender’s crime and whether sufficient 
punishment had been served.1  However, the Legislature amended the parole laws in 2011 (the 
“2011 Amendments”), requiring the Board for the first time to include objective, evidence-based 
assessments in its decision making.  Respondent asserts (Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Verified Answer and in Opposition to Petition (“Resp. Br.”) 11) that the 2011 Amendments were 
minor, “technical changes” that had no impact on the Board’s discretion or the manner in which 
it was required to make its decisions.  That argument misconstrues the language of the 2011 
Amendments, the clear legislative intent underlying them, and the decided cases.   
Respondent also argues (Resp. Br. 12) that because the parole law still requires “a case-
                                                 
1 When Executive Law § 259-i was first enacted, the Board was responsible for setting minimum periods of 
imprisonment (“MPIs”) for inmates serving indeterminate sentences if a court had not already done so, in addition to 
overseeing parole. 1977 N.Y. Laws ch. 904 (enacting N.Y. Exec. Law former § 259-i(1)) (Add. 6).  MPI was 
decided solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense and the prior criminal record of the inmate—expressly 
static and backwards-looking factors.  N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(1) (McKinney 1977).  Although the Board stopped 
making MPI determinations in the 1980s, the guidelines remained on the books until the 2011 amendments.  See 
N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (McKinney 2009); see also N.Y.C.R.R. § 8001.3(a) (regulations repealed by the 
2011 Amendments stating that static sentencing grid “will be considered in each MPI and release decision”). 







by-case review of . . . the statutory factors,” the 2011 Amendments were largely meaningless.  
This argument ignores the basic principle that when the Legislature enacts new legislation, it is 
presumed to have intended to make a material change in the law.  See In re Stein, 131 A.D.2d 68, 
71-72 (2d Dep’t 1987).  Moreover, Ms.  has never argued, as Respondent contends (Resp. 
Br. 12), that the 2011 Amendments eliminated the need for individualized review; rather they 
enhanced the need for truly individualized review, requiring the Parole Board to view each 
offender as an individual in the context of his or her ability to re-enter society, not as a 
manifestation of the crime the individual committed. 
There are five other reasons for concluding that the 2011 Amendments mandate a 
forward-looking assessment. 
First, at the time of the bill’s 2011 passage, experts in the field, such as Columbia Law 
School professor Philip Genty, wrote that the Amendments involved the “replacement of static, 
past-focused ‘guidelines’ with more dynamic present and future-focused risk-assessment 
‘procedures’ to guide the Parole Board,” which “has the potential to affect significantly the way 
that the Parole Board conducts discretionary release determinations.”  Philip M. Genty, Changes 
to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping Policy Shift, N.Y.L.J. Sept. 1, 2011. 
Second, the Assembly’s Committee on Corrections has consistently made clear that those 
Amendments were intended to fundamentally shift the law to effect a forward-looking approach.  
Every edition of the Committee’s Annual Report since 2013 has referenced the need to improve 
the Board’s decision-making and refocus its work on a forward-looking paradigm.2  See, e.g., 
                                                 
2 Respondent asserts that “a risk and needs assessment is not even mentioned” in the 2011 Annual Report.  
However, the report states that “[t]he budget legislation also includes a requirement that the Board establish new 
written procedures for its use in making parole release decisions.  These new guidelines will incorporate risk and 
needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board and the likelihood of success of 
such persons upon release.”  See N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2011 Annual Report at 5 (2011) available 
at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2011Annual/report.pdf.  While the 2010 Report did not explicitly mention 
the legislation—it also did not mention the Parole Board merger with the Department of Corrections and 







N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2013 Annual Report at 3 (2016) available at 
http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2016Annual/index.pdf (noting that the Parole Board 
regulations in effect at the time “did not comply with the intent of the Legislature in that they 
treated risk and needs principles enacted in 2011 as a mere factor in the decision-making process 
rather than as the fundamental basis for release decisions”3 (Emphasis added.))4  Respondent’s 
attempt to cast aside the opinion of the Assembly Committee is unavailing.  The 2016 Report 
and its predecessors reflect a clear frustration with the Board’s refusal to follow the mandate 
created by the 2011 law, and provide a strong indication of how leading legislators viewed its 
purpose and effect. 
Third, comments of individual legislators demonstrate the forward-looking assessment 
required by the 2011 Amendments.  At a 2013 hearing on parole reform after adoption of the 
2011 Amendments, Assembly Member Giglio stated that “[i]t was a mistake to leave it to the 
Parole Board to [enact complying regulations] itself,” and that “with such bad faith and frankly, 
unprofessional conduct, it seems to me that there’s a much bigger club that needs to be used to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”)—it listed parole reform as a key issue to be addressed, “to evaluate whether 
the practices and procedures in place today for both the Division of Parole and the Board of Parole are fair and 
effective, and to make recommendations to improve future outcomes.”  See N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 
2010 Annual Report at 14 (2010) available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2010Annual/index.pdf. 
3 As noted in Ms  initial brief, the Board failed to draft regulations compliant with Executive Law for more 
than five years after passage of the 2011 Amendments, and at least one court held that its refusal to do so violated 
the law.  See Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Article 78 Petition (“Pet’r Br.”) at 32, n.21 (citing 
Morris v. N.Y. State. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226 (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013), amended by 
975 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013)). 
4 See also N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2013 Annual Report at 10 (2013) available at 
http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2013Annual/index.pdf (discussing a hearing held to determine what changes 
were necessary “to ensure that inmates who do not pose a public safety risk are released from prison in a timely and 
rational fashion” and noting that the Committee will continue to encourage legislation to “permit increased parole of 
inmates posing little risk to public safety”); N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2014 Annual Report at 14 
(2014) available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2014Annual/index.pdf (noting that the Committee will 
continue to advocate “to make sure that inmates who do not pose a public safety risk are released to community 
supervision as quickly as possible”); N.Y. State Assembly Comm’n on Corr., 2015 Annual Report at 16 (2015) 
available at http://nyassembly.gov/comm/Correct/2015Annual/index.pdf (repeating sentiments from 2014 report 
and adding advocacy for inmates “who are assessed as posing a low risk of recidivism” being released “unless the 
Board identifies overriding factors militating against release that were not taken into account by such assessments”) 
(emphasis added).   







reform [the parole] process . . . It’s not just about some procedures about how to use 
COMPAS.”5  This statement directly rebuts Respondent’s argument that if the Legislature 
intended to fundamentally change the law, it would have used stronger language.  The 
Legislature did think it had used strong enough language, it simply did not expect the Board to 
do everything possible to sidestep its mandate.6  Respondent cites no countervailing legislative 
history to indicate that such a shift was not intended to overcome the presumption of a material 
change in the law.  There is little question the 2011 law was meant to incorporate the forward-
looking idea of objective risks-and-needs principles throughout parole decision-making, not just 
as a minor counterweight to the practice of denying parole based on the seriousness of a crime. 
Fourth, numerous courts have recognized the fundamental shift required by the 2011 
Amendments.  Contrary to the cases relied upon Respondent which do little more than cite 
general, pre-existing propositions of law, cases that have analyzed the intent underlying the 2011 
Amendments have consistently favored Petitioner’s reading of the statute.  See Mackenzie v. 
Stanford, No. 2789/15, NYLJ 1202759023393, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. 2015) (the 2011 
Amendments require the Board “to focus on an applicant’s rehabilitation and future rather than 
giving undue weight to the crime of conviction and to the inmate’s pre-incarceration behavior”); 
                                                 
5 N.Y. State Assembly Standing Comm. on Corr., Testimony from Public Hearing, Board of Parole (hereinafter 
“Committee Testimony”) at 173:10-16 (Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://nystateassembly.granicus.com/Document
Viewer.php?file=nystateassembly_fb550f4dc8b2cb99d203b3db32a36fb3.pdf.   
6 Indeed, the Board itself seems to have recognized that its initial response to the 2011 Amendments was inadequate, 
but remains determined to avoid changing its decision making process in any meaningful way.  Immediately after 
the Amendments were passed, the Board released only a memorandum from its counsel discussing the COMPAS 
assessment and noting that risk-and-needs assessments should be considered.  After courts divided on the propriety 
of this response, the Board began the process of creating official regulations designed to encompass risk-and-needs 
assessments.  The Board adopted one set of regulations in 2014 (N.Y. St. Reg., vol. XXXVI, issue 30 at 11 (July 30, 
2014)), which were widely viewed as inadequate, and updated those regulations in 2017—six years after the 2011 
Amendments passed—to require that the Board provide a detailed explanation if it departs from a COMPAS 
recommendation.  9 NYCRR §§ 8002.2-3 (eff. Sept. 27, 2017).  From Respondent’s argument, (Resp. Br. 15) the 
Board has adopted the position that such a departure occurs only when it specifically rejects the COMPAS’s 
conclusion (e.g. believes the assessment is itself incorrect), not when it reaches a release decision inconsistent with 
the objective, forward-thinking assessment.  This approach appears specifically designed to undermine the 
legislative mandate that the Board incorporate forward-thinking mechanisms into its decision making.   







Platten v. N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694, 699 (Sup. Ct. Sull. Cty. 2015) (“The changes 
were intended to shift the focus of parole boards away from focusing on the severity or heinous 
nature of the instant office, to a forward-thinking paradigm to evaluate whether an inmate is 
rehabilitated and ready for release.”); Thwaites v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 34 Misc. 3d 694, 699 
(Sup. Ct. Or. Cty. 2011) (issued shortly after passage of the law, noting that the 2011 
Amendments “are remedial in nature and designed to modernize decision-making in the area of 
parole release”); see also People v. Brown, 25 N.Y.3d 247, 251 (2015) (observing that “the 2011 
amendments were not purely budgetary or technical changes” because they “emphasized ‘the 
evolution of the sentencing structure’ toward a ‘focus on reentry’”). 
Fifth, the statute’s text and structure further support Petitioner’s view that the 2011 
Amendments represented a fundamental shift in the way the Board is required to make decisions.  
The Amendments, requiring that the Board consider risk-and-needs principles in every case,7 
were codified in Executive Law § 259-c, which sets out the fundamental “functions, powers and 
duties” of the Parole Board.  Section 259-i, titled “Procedures for the conduct of the work of the 
state board of parole,” which Respondent relies on for the proposition that it need not give any 
deference to Ms.  risk assessment, merely sets forth the procedures by which those parole 
duties are carried out.  That section states that the factors the Board must consider are to be made 
according to “the procedures adopted pursuant to [§ 259-c(4)].”  Id. at § 259-i(2)(c)(A).   
Had the Legislature merely wanted to make risk-and-needs principles another factor in 
§ 259-i, it could have amended the § 259-i factors separately in the same bill.  Yet, it chose to 
place the language in the section outlining the fundamental powers and duties of the Board for a 
                                                 
7 Compare N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4) (McKinney 2009) (the Board’s “written guidelines may consider the use of a 
risk and needs assessment instrument” (emphasis added) with N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-c(4) (McKinney 2011) (the 
Board’s “written procedures” “shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure” the rehabilitation standard 
(emphasis added)). 







reason.  See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section, . . . it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”).  The most natural reading of the statute is that when making decisions, the Board 
must exercise its discretion in line with its fundamental duties under the governing statute, § 259-
c—which requires the forward-looking risk and needs assessment.  Regardless of whether this 
statutory change mandates any particular result (see Resp. Br. 11-15), it demonstrates that the 
Legislature believed risk-and-needs principles were an essential component of the Board’s 
duties.  At a minimum, it provides a lens through which all of the § 259-i factors must be viewed. 
Contrary to Respondent’s overbroad contention, Petitioner’s argument is not, and never 
has been, that the presence of a risk-and-needs assessment mandates a particular result.8  Rather, 
it is that the 2011 Amendments were intended to create a paradigm shift in the Board’s approach 
to its work so that it makes a forward-looking assessment of the parole applicant, and that a 
decision—such as the one here—which recognizes an offender’s complete rehabilitation, but 
casts it aside based on nothing more than the seriousness of the crime, fails to reflect adequate 
consideration under the law, constituting an abuse of discretion.   
Here, the distinction is dispositive.  Respondent concedes (Resp. Br. 15) that, based on 
her COMPAS assessment, “the Board did not find that there is a reasonable probability that 
Petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law.”  Using a forward-
looking paradigm, there is no legitimate basis to deny parole.  However, by maintaining its 
position that parole decisions may be based entirely on factors tied to past behavior and a desire 
                                                 
8 Respondent cites to numerous cases for the proposition that the COMPAS assessment—one of the manifestations 
of evidence-based risk-and-needs assessment—is only an “additional consideration” that the Board must consider 
amongst other factors.  See Resp. Br. 16.  While those cases reflect an unduly restrictive reading of the law, they are 
not inconsistent with Petitioner’s arguments that the 2011 Amendments change the Board’s fundamental analysis, 
even if no particular result is required. 







for punishment, Respondent argues its decision cannot be set aside.  Under the Board’s 
approach, the Board could in every decision, no matter how rehabilitated a person was, state that 
it did not depart from the COMPAS assessment but nonetheless render it meaningless by 
denying parole.  Although the Board has discretion, it may not subvert the will of the Legislature 
to accomplish its own goals, as it seeks to do here.   
B. The Board’s Denial Unlawfully Relied on the Seriousness of Ms.  Crime 
Wholly apart from its fundamental error of law, the Board’s denial of parole was 
improper because the sole basis for its decision was the seriousness of Ms.  crime.  This 
is impermissible.  It is black letter law in the First Department that “in order to preclude the 
granting of parole exclusively on ‘the seriousness of the crime’ there must have been some 
significantly aggravating or egregious circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
particular crime.”  King v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431-33 (1st Dep’t 1993), 
aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994); see also Matter of Rossakis v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 
22, 27 (1st Dep’t 2016) (“The Board may not deny parole based solely on the seriousness of the 
offense.”); other cases cited in Pet’r Br. 11.9 
Respondent concedes that Ms.  is fully rehabilitated and presents no danger to 
society.  Resp. Br. 15.  While in prison, Ms  has earned a Bachelors and a Masters degree, 
has mentored and aided the rehabilitation of hundreds of prisoners, founded a nationally 
replicated AIDS education program, become an expert in infant care and served in Bedford 
Hills’ parenting center, and trained dogs to help both law enforcement and veterans, among 
                                                 
9 Notwithstanding this well-established law, parole denial based solely on the seriousness of the crime is a 
longstanding practice of the Parole Board.  Former Parole Board Chair Robert Dennison testified to the Assembly 
that “if the Parole Board doesn’t like the crime, they’re not going to let you out.  It doesn’t matter what else you’ve 
accomplished, to be quite frank about it.”  Committee Testimony (supra n.5) at 104:10-13.  Another former Board 
Commissioner, Thomas Grant, testified that the Board process was “broken,” in part because it typically engages in 
a “static evaluation despite what all of the legislation has attempted to do,” because “they can do it.  They can just 
look at the instant offense and nothing else.”  Id. at 128-30.   







many other accomplishments.  See Verified Petition (“Ver. Pet.”) at ¶¶ 26-35.  As Governor 
Cuomo said when he granted Ms.  clemency, “I think the situation is corrected as it ever 
going to be, unless you can bring a person back to life.”  Ver. Pet. Exhibit 3 (hereinafter “Vol. 
II”) at 386.  In light of this record, what possible reason could there be to deny parole other than 
the seriousness of the crime?  And, under King, to deny parole based on the seriousness of the 
crime there must be “aggravating circumstances,” which are nowhere referred to in the Parole 
decision and in any event are not present.10   
While Respondent makes much of the fact that the decision and the parole hearing 
discuss other aspects of Ms.  application other than the crime itself, the record must 
reflect more than mere references to other issues, it must show a qualitative assessment of the 
factors to demonstrate that denial was based on more than the seriousness of a crime.  See 
Cappiello v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 6 Misc. 3d 1010(A), at *4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2004) 
(Wetzel, J.). (“When the record of the Parole hearing fails to convincingly demonstrate that the 
Parole Board . . . qualitatively weigh[ed] the relevant factors in light of the three statutorily 
acceptable standards for denying parole release, the decision is arbitrary and capricious.”); see 
also Ely v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 100407/16, at 13-14 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan. 20, 2017) 
(Jaffe, J.) (ordering de novo hearing where the Board, including Commissioner Ludlow, 
                                                 
10 Respondent’s brief (Resp. Br. 19), implicitly concedes the insufficiency of the Board’s decision, by attempting for 
the first time in this proceeding to identify “aggravating factors” that were never mentioned by the Board or the 
Appeals Unit.  The law is clear that “judicial review of an administrative determination is limited to the grounds 
invoked by the agency,” and courts may not “affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be 
a more adequate or proper basis.”  Madeiros v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 30 N.Y.3d 67, 74 (2017); Scherbyn v. 
Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 753, 758 (1991).  
In any event, Ms  crime—though terrible—has no aggravating factors, and Respondent’s two-sentence 
attempt to manufacture them, unsupported by case law, would not revive an otherwise improper denial of parole. 
Ms. , a getaway driver in an armed robbery, who has fully accepted responsibility for her crimes, is a far cry 
from the parole applicant in Phillips, the pre-2011 case on which Respondent relies.  There, the petitioner was a 
former police officer who abused his own authority while engaged in a long-term extortion plot and shot three 
people himself, and whose “limited remorse” was found to actually deprecate the seriousness of his crime.  See 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D. 3d 17, 22-24 (1st Dep’t 2007). 







discussed other aspects of application, but the decision reflected a “marked disinclination to 
consider [Petitioner’s] achievements and other mitigating factors or explain how or why they are 
outweighed by the severity of her crime.”).11  Here, even though the Board—or at least one 
Commissioner—engaged in some discussion of Ms.  remorse and achievements, the clear 
focus of the transcript and the entirety of the Board’s decision demonstrate an “overwhelming 
emphasis” on the offense, rendering the decision improper.  See Pulinario v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 42 Misc.3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2014) (Moulton, J.). 
This lack of meaningful review is especially evident in the Board’s written decision.  It is 
no coincidence that Respondent is forced to rely heavily on quotes from the hearing transcript to 
support its claims about the written decision’s sufficiency.  See Resp. Br. 21.  While the review 
of a written decision’s adequacy may take the hearing into account, a review of this decision 
demonstrates that the only basis for denial was the seriousness of the crime.  The decision begins, 
as most do, by reciting the boilerplate legal standard for parole.  It then provides significant 
detail about Ms.  crime, again focusing on who she was at the time of the crime rather 
than who she is today.  Next, the decision rotely lists some of Ms.  accomplishments and 
parrots the materials reviewed.  Only then does it list its bases for denying parole: statements 
from others—presumably about the nature of Ms.  crime, entirely unidentified “additional 
information” that Governor Cuomo supposedly lacked when granting Ms.  clemency, and 
                                                 
11 These are far from isolated decisions.  In recent years, courts have begun exercising more exacting judicial review 
over the Board’s improper practices, without unduly limiting its discretion.  This is true at the appellate level, where 
the First and Second Departments have regularly overturned Parole Board decisions that rely on the seriousness of 
the crime.  See Coleman v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 2017-07296, 2018 WL 343803, at *1 
(2d Dep’t Jan. 10, 2018); Rossakis, 146 A.D.3d at 28; Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d 707, (2d Dep’t 2014); Huntley 
v. Evans, 77 A.D.3d 945, 947 (2d Dep’t 2010); Johnson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 65 A.D.3d 838, 839 (4th Dep’t 
2009); Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D.3d 304, 307, (1st Dep’t 2005).  It also includes cases from this Court and 
numerous other Supreme Courts throughout the state.  See e.g. Almonor, 16 Misc. 3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 
2007) (York, J.); Rios v. N.Y State Div. of Parole, 15 Misc. 3d 1107(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) (Partnow, J.); 
Weinstein v. Dennison, 7 Misc. 3d 1009(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2005) (Kornreich, J.); Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of 
Parole, 14 Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bx. Cty. 2006); McBride v. Evans, 988 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. 2014). 





Ms. - status as a "symbol of violent an d teIToristic crime." App. 195-96. It closes by 
telling Ms. - that maybe, if she can convince more of the public to get on her side, she will 
have a better chance for parole at her next hearing . Id. 
To the extent that the decision purpo1is to be based on th e fact that Ms. - release 
would deprecate the seriousness of the offense or undennine respect for the law, nowhere does 
th e decision explain why that is so oth er than because it was a serious crime. The decision and 
transcript can be searched in vain for any basis for parole denial other than the seriousness of the 
crime. Petitioner has spent more th an 36 years in prison (which Respondent refers to (Resp. Br. 
18) as "only 36 years after the ... robbe1y " (emphasis added)), and is the th ird longest-serving 
woman in a New York State prison . In addition, the Parole Board, as well as a President of the 
United States, have paroled some participants in the Brinks robbe1y who were far more complicit 
than Ms. - and virtually all other pa1iicipants have been released (Vol. 2 at 614; Pet'r Br. 
22, n.13). 12 It therefore defies explanation, notwithstanding Respondent's dismissal of the 
argument as "nTelevant," th at releasing Ms. - who represents the best of what an offender 
can become, would somehow deprecate the seriousness of the crime or undennine respect for the 
law. The law requii·es more, and th e Board fell short of that in this case. 
C. The Parole Board Improperly Relied on Generalized Community Opposition 
Of the many unlawful ways the Board relies on the seriousness of Ms. - crime, its 
reliance on generalized community opposition to Ms. - release is paiiicularly problematic. 
As a prelimina1y matter, there is no question that the Boai·d heavily based its decision on what it 
12 Respondent's argument (Resp. Br. 27) that Kathy Boudin's release in 2002 demonstrates that this board could not 
have been predisposed to deny Ms. - application is entirely baseless. Neither of the commissioners who voted 
to release Ms. Boudin remain on th~ . See Beth Schwartzapefel, A Parole Heming in New York, With a 
Governor 's Blessing This Time (Jan. 5, 201 7), available at https://wv.rw.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/05/a-parole-
hearing-in-new-york-with-a-govemor-s-blessing-this-time. While Ms. Boudin's release demonstrates that parole 
may be granted without undennining respect for the law or deprecating the seriousness of the crime, it has no 
bearing on the fe.elings of the commissioners who sat on Ms- panel or the reasons for denial in this case. 
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interpreted to be society’s views of the seriousness of Ms.  crime—it says as much in its 
brief.  See Resp. Br. 14 (discussing decision based on “public perceptions of the seriousness of a 
crime”).  Recent cases have held that this type of public opinion, which has nothing to do with 
the offender’s risk to society and everything to do with the nature of the crime, cannot support 
denying parole because it does nothing more than insert penal philosophy into what should be an 
individualized release determination.  See Ruzas v. Stanford, No. 1456/2016 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. 
Jan. 30, 2017) (“Ruzas I”); Ely, at 13-14; Ramirez v. Stanford, No. 1928/2016 at 3 (Sup. Ct. Du. 
Cty. Feb. 7, 2017) (“Ramirez”) (“As members of the parole board are not permitted to apply their 
own penal philosophy in determining whether release is appropriate, it necessarily follows that 
they may not deny parole release based upon letters from third parties expressing their penal 
philosophies.”); Kinard v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, No. 217417 (Sup. Ct. Du. Cty. Jan 19, 2018) 
(“Presumably, such individuals have no first-hand knowledge of facts relevant to the Parole 
Board . . . .”) (attached hereto as Exhibit 1).13 
Even courts that have read the law differently do not require a different result, as they 
have made clear that even if the list of permissible communications which the Board can 
consider is broader than those explicitly within the statute, generalized community opposition, 
especially based on penal philosophy, is nonetheless improper.  See Matter of Bottom v. Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 092448-17 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. Nov. 2, 2017) (“Bottom I”) 
(“[A] non-individualized objection to the parole release of an individual because his or her crime 
falls within a class of crimes would appear to be improper.”).  Respondent’s two primary cases 
are entirely inapposite to Ms. .  Matter of Grigger v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 11 A.D.3d 
                                                 
13 Respondent’s claim that the Board’s obligation to preserve the confidentiality of the names and addresses of 
submissions means that it must be able to consider them lacks merit.  “That section does not address or govern the 
individuals who are authorized to provide information to the Parole Board with respect to a release application.  It 
addresses the confidentiality of identifying information provided to a Parole Board.”  Kinard, No. 217417, at *4; see 
also Pet’r Br. at 38-39. 







850, 852 (3d Dep’t 2004), leave denied 4 N.Y.3d 704 (2005) was about a letter from a District 
Attorney, not generalized public opposition, and therefore has no bearing here.  Matter of Bottom 
v. Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 092448-17 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. Jan. 10, 2018) 
(“Bottom II”), which Respondent cites for the proposition that consideration of generalized penal 
philosophy documents did not taint a parole denial, contains significantly different facts.  In 
Bottom II, the Court held that there was no evidence the Board had been influenced by the letters 
it had received.  Id.  Here, the record here is replete with evidence the Board not only agreed 
with the penal philosophy expressed by community opposition, but explicitly stated that its 
decision was largely based upon it.  The Board’s decision made no secret of the fact that it 
believed Ms.  release was incompatible with the welfare of society as noted by 
“thousands of its members, and because Ms.  is still a symbol of violent and terroristic 
crime.”  App. 196.  The Board then strongly implied that the best way for Ms.  to achieve a 
different result at her next appearance would be to try and make it so that not as many letters 
expressing the same penal philosophy were submitted.   
While Ms.  has not seen the documents, because the Board has refused to produce 
them, see Part II, infra, it is highly unlikely that boilerplate letters from “thousands” of members 
of the community, which convinced the Board that Ms.  is a “symbol” of crime, are based 
on anything more than a belief that Ms.  deserves continued punishment because of who 
she was in 1981 and what she did then.  This clear reliance on inappropriate, generalized 
community opposition expressing a penal philosophy is both improper by itself and additional 
evidence of the Board’s unlawful decision based upon the seriousness of Ms.  crime.   
If permitted, Respondent’s view turns parole into a popularity contest subject to political 
whims, rather than an independent, objective evaluation of an applicant’s fitness for release.  No 







matter how positive the risk assessment, if what the Board deems to be enough members of a 
community, who have no knowledge of the offender’s extensive rehabilitation, sign a petition 
objecting to her release the Parole Board can deny the application.  That is not the law. 
Additionally, Respondent asserts that Ms.  “cannot have it both ways” by asking the 
Court to ignore generalized community opposition while she herself had many letters of support.  
Resp. Br. 31.  There is a categorical difference between the “boxes and boxes” of generalized 
public opposition letters Respondent relied upon, which are discussed in the Board’s written 
decision, and the hundreds of letters of support submitted on Petitioner’s behalf by people who 
actually know Ms.  and have witnessed her transformation and accomplishments first hand, 
which are not discussed.  The authors of these letters include the long-time Superintendent of 
Bedford Hills who believed Ms.  should have released in 2004, numerous public officials 
and civic leaders, and dozens of others whose lives she has touched.  Those letters speak directly 
to the factors contained within the parole laws, warranting consideration by the Board. 
D. The Written Parole Decision Fails to Provide Sufficient Detail to Explain the 
Board’s Decision 
The Board’s written decision was also improper because it failed to explain the reasons 
for denial of parole “in detail and not in conclusory terms.”  N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(a).  
Though it need not discuss each factor in detail, a written decision “may not summarily itemize a 
petitioner’s achievements while incarcerated or render a conclusory decision parroting the 
statutory standard,” as happened here.  See Ely, at 12; Coaxum v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 14 
Misc. 3d 661 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cty. 2006) (rejecting “perfunctory” discussion of positive factors 
because “actual consideration of factors means more than acknowledging that evidence of them 
was before the Board”).  The written decision itself must provide some basis from which a reader 
can determine how the factors were weighed and why release was not warranted.  See Coaxum, 







827 N.Y.S. 2d at 494 (“The decisionmaking is a process of determining which factors outweigh 
others: a balancing process.”).   
No matter how many times the Board’s decision is reviewed, the reader is still unable to 
understand why, given Ms.  undisputed rehabilitation, parole was denied because “release 
. . . is incompatible with the welfare of society . . . and that it would deprecate the seriousness of 
the crime.”  App. 192.  Respondent cannot avoid its statutory responsibility solely by referencing 
the hearing transcript and relying on the vague notion that the Board need not discuss each factor 
in detail, which again willfully misconstrues Ms.  argument.  As discussed in greater 
detail in Ms.  initial brief (Pet’r Br. 24-28), the Board’s decision lists without discussion 
some of Ms. accomplishments and acknowledges her remorse, but provides no 
information as to why those were insufficient.  The absence of meaningful interaction between 
the factors, not the number of words on the page, is what renders the decision improper. 
E. The Record As A Whole Demonstrates The Board’s Bias and Predetermination 
There is no question that, upon a showing of evidence of bias by even one member of the 
Board, the decision must be vacated and a de novo hearing granted.  See Rios v. N.Y. State Div. 
of Parole, 15 Misc. 3d 1107(A) (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2007) (presence of a Board member for 
whom denial is a foregone conclusion is sufficient to taint the entire proceeding); Rabenbauer v. 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 46 Misc. 3d 603, 607 (Sup. Ct. Sul. Cty. 2014) 
(commissioners may not base decisions on their own beliefs about the nature of the offense).  
Here, a review of the full record shows that the Board predetermined the outcome of Ms.  
hearing and had no intention of giving her an objective opportunity for release. 
Although Ms.  initial brief gives repeated examples of statements by the Board 
members demonstrating their animosity towards Ms.  and predetermination to deny her 
parole (Pet’r Br. 11-16), it is telling that Respondent responded to only two of those statements.  







Resp. Br. 23-27.  In any event the record is clear, as a review of the transcript thoroughly 
demonstrates the nature and extent of that bias.  Former Commissioner Ludlow, who was 
subsequently held in contempt for his “administrative arrogance” and “contemptible” treatment 
of parole applicants before him, see Ruzas v. Bd. of Parole, No. 1456/2016, at 9 (Sup. Ct. Du. 
Cty. Oct. 18, 2017) (“Ruzas II”), went to great, and wholly unnecessary lengths to discuss the 
details of Ms.  crime in a manner that betrayed his true opinion about the crime, and 
about Ms. .  See Pet’r Br. 11-16, 28.  There was no reason, for example, for Commissioner 
Ludlow, to describe the crime with the words “terrorist swat team” or “slaughter,” no reason to 
dwell on—and repeatedly return to—details of the crime in which Ms.  played absolutely 
no role, and no reason to discuss his penal philosophy by comparing the idea of “mercy” on 
parole to mercy for the victims of Ms.  crime.  See id.  All of which stands in stark 
contrast to Commissioner Ludlow’s virtual silence when the discussion turned to Ms.  30 
years of achievements, during which time he did not ask a single substantive question.14  
Respondent’s argument that discussion of the crime allowed Ms.  to open up about her 
remorse and facilitate a conversation does not come close to justifying the invective and colorful 
language used by the Board in asking the questions.   
F. Denial of Parole Effectively Resentenced Ms  
When the Parole Board uses its authority to impose its own belief about punishment, or 
when a Board freely admits that no greater rehabilitation could be asked for, yet denies parole 
anyway, it has effectively imposed its own sentence on the parole applicant.  See Almonor v. N.Y. 
State Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc. 3d 1126(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2007) (York, J.)  That is what 
happened here, and Respondent cannot avoid that conclusion by relying on the broad proposition 
                                                 
14 As noted in Ms.  initial brief, there is also a demonstrated basis supporting a finding that the other two 
commissioners on the Board exhibited bias and predetermined the outcome.  See Pet’r Br. 14-15. 





that there is no guaranteed right to parole. Ms .• has been in prison for more than 36 years. 
She has fully accepted responsibility for her actions, and spent the past three decades helping 
thousands of people, both inside and out of prison. She has been granted clemency by the 
Governor for those actions, and Respondent freely admits that she poses no danger to society. It 
is difficult to believe there is anything Ms .• could say or do before her next scheduled 
appearance that would make any of the above less tiue. 
At the same time, there is nothing Ms .• can do to change the seriousness of her 
crime or take back what she has done. In this case, the Board was paiiicularly ti·ansparent about 
its intent, denying parole in lai·ge paii because of Ms- supposed status as a symbol of 
crime. App. 196. If the Boai·d did not believe parole was wairnnted after 36 years, nothing Ms . 
• can do before her next pai·ole hearing in April 2019 will change that fact. Thus, if the 
Board 's detennination is upheld, it will effectively mean that Ms- cannot possibly satisfy 
the Boai·d's interpretation of the pai·ole requirements, effectively resentencing her to life in 
prison despite her clemency and decades of positive works. This is improper, and cannot stand. 15 
II. The Board's Failure to Produce Documents Was Illegal and An Abuse of Discretion 
Immediately after filing her administi·ative appeal, and as the parole law specifically 
provides (9 N.Y.C.R.R. 8006 et seq.), Ms. -requested all documents in her parole record. 
App. 208. The Board acknowledges Ms. - entitlement to documents, as well as its 
possession of and capacity to produce them. See Resp. Br. 31, n. 10. It nonetheless asserts it 
should not be ordered to produce them because (A) it is not the right entity to produce its own 
documents, and (B) the documents fall under the Boai·d 's expansive definition of confidentiality. 
15 Respondent cannot avoid this conclusion by arguing that it is only Ms. - first appearance before the Board. 
See Resp. Br. 22, 27. Additionally, Respondent's implication that those ~ ear before the Board for the first 
time are somehow les s fit for parole because they have not sufficiently been through the process represents a 
perversion of the parole process and is unlawful. An offender' s satisfaction of the requirements for parole has 
nothing to do with the amount of time they have spent in prison~specially when that time is nearly four decades. 
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Neither argument is supportable.  
A. The Board Has the Responsibility and Capability to Produce the Record 
Respondent concedes that it was aware of Ms.  request for records, that the 
request was properly filed, and that it in fact possesses the requested documents.16  Nevertheless, 
it points the finger at DOCCS and disclaims all responsibility for the enforcement of its own 
statutes.  According to the Board, if Ms.  was dissatisfied with her non-receipt of the 
documents, she should have: i) continued to demand them from DOCCS, ii) requested from the 
Parole Board an extension of time to file her administrative appeal,17 iii) if still dissatisfied, 
brought an Article 78 proceeding against DOCCS, iv) when that issue was resolved, return to the 
Administrative Appeals Unit to perfect her parole appeal, and v) then, if necessary, brought an 
Article 78 proceeding!  Resp. Br. 39.  That such a procedure would have meant that two years 
would certainly have elapsed before this case could be heard—and by then Ms.  would be 
entitled to a new parole hearing in any event18—apparently does not concern Respondent.   
Not only is this argument frivolous, it cannot be squared with the statute, regulations, or 
case law.  New York Executive Law requires that “the chairman of the board of parole”—not 
DOCCS—“maintain records of all parole interview and hearings” (N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(6)(b) 
(emphasis added)) which is defined by the regulations to include those maintained by the 
division [of parole] (9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.3 (“The term record or records means any 
memorandum, document, tabulation or other writing . . . maintained by the division.”)).  
Moreover, even if a DOCCS employees is responsible for fielding document requests, he is the 
                                                 
16 Respondent’s answer annexed for in camera review some of the very records Petitioner requested and also asked, 
if it was in fact ordered to produce the requested records, to be given 30 days to produce them.  Resp. Br. 31, n. 10. 
17 Respondent’s repeated assurance that it would grant extensions of time to permit Ms. to appeal the denial of 
document production (see, e.g., Resp. Br. 39) misses the point: Ms. does not want to extend her stay in prison 
any longer than is necessary to overturn the Board’s abuse of authority. 
18 An applicant denied parole is entitled to a new interview within two years.  N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a). 







“employee designated by the chairman [of the Parole Board] to receive and respond to inquiries 
for access to division of records.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.2 (emphasis added).  
Moreover, DOCCS’ alleged assumption of duties to maintain documents in the Board’s 
possession did not divest the Board of its responsibility under the statute.  The amendments to 
the Executive Law cited by Respondent neither deprive the Board of continued responsibility to 
maintain documents nor take such documents out of the Board’s possession, it merely assigns 
additional responsibility to DOCCS.19  2011 N.Y. Laws, ch. 62, Part C, Subpt. A., § 40.  Indeed, 
the current parole regulations expressly permit Parole Board officials—and those like them—to 
make records available as they have done in the past.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8008.3 (the law “shall not 
be construed to prohibit officials who have in the past been authorized to make records or 
information available to the public from continuing to do so”).  Notwithstanding the alleged 
transfer, the Board continues to retain the right to “use,” “access,” and “make such entries as the 
board of parole deems appropriate.”  N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-k(1). 
The Board’s contention that it is not authorized to disclose the requested documents 
(Resp. Br. 37), is belied by the words of the statute and the decided cases.  In Ruzas v. Stanford, 
the Board was ordered to produce redacted versions of community opposition letters and was 
able to do so in a short period of time.  See Ruzas II, at 12; Ruzas I, at n. 1 (“The Court also 
reviewed, in camera, confidential documents submitted by Respondent.”); see also People v. 
Jones, 34 Misc.3d 1217(A) (Cty. Ct. Essex Cty. 2012) (“The report sought by the defendant here 
                                                 
19 In a similar context of federal Freedom of Information Act requests, courts have repeatedly held that agencies 
cannot shirk their responsibility for processing document requests in their possession by claiming another agency is 
responsible for those documents.  See Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 248 (7th Cir. 1992) (“The agency cannot avoid the 
request or withhold the documents by referring them back to the agency where they originated.”); Greenberg v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 18 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[E]ven though Customs referred these documents to other 
agencies for review and processing, Customs is still responsible for explaining their non-production.”); Kennedy v. 
U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 03-CV-6076-CJS(FE), 2004 WL 2285058, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2004) (“Once 
a FOIA request has been made to an agency, that agency's referral to a different agency regarding disclosure does 
not divest the original agency of responsibility to respond to the FOIA request.”). 







already is, or should be, in the possession of the Parole Board and it is within the authority of the 
Chairman to allow the defendant access to that report.” (emphasis added)).   
Furthermore, Respondent’s position is contradicted by the requirement that a petitioner 
raise the denial of access to the record in the Administrative Appeals process to preserve it for 
review under Article 78.  Wade v. Stanford, No. 522949, 2017 WL 1167761, at *1 (3d Dep’t 
2017); Santos v. Evans, 81 A.D.3d 1059, 1060 (3d Dep’t 2011) (“Although petitioner further 
asserts that he was denied access to confidential materials considered by the Board, he has not 
preserved this claim for our review given his failure to raise it in his administrative appeal.”).  If 
the Appeals Unit or the Supreme Court had no authority to order the Parole Board to release 
documents it supposedly does not have, that requirement would be completely superfluous.   
Finally, Respondent’s position would undermine any meaningful right of appeal.  It takes 
up to eight months from the day notice of parole appeal is filed until the day an Article 78 may 
be filed.  By the time the Article 78 process on the documents is complete, the process must 
begin anew on a parole appeal.20  Even a wholly successful Article 78 parole claim would likely 
take longer than the period between statutorily mandated parole hearings.  This puts petitioners 
in a lose-lose situation: pursue the statutory right to their own record to conduct a fully informed 
appeal, effectively eliminating any practical relief if successful, or roll the dice based on 
                                                 
20 Ms  experience is a perfect illustration of the problem with the Board’s view.  Although Ms.  filed a 
notice of appeal and requested the documents immediately following the Board’s decision (App. 208), production of 
a “final response” was delayed for months by a litany of excuses, including bureaucratic error, vacation, and being 
subject to additional scrutiny because her case was “high profile.”  Vol. II at 104, 117-18.  And that allegedly 
completed “final response” was not final; after Ms.  counsel pointed out that additional document requests 
were still outstanding—lack of production then being acknowledged to be an “oversight”—another response was 
delivered declining to produce anything else.  See App. 237-39; Vol II. at 1017-19.  The Appeals Unit took nearly 
four months—the maximum time it was allowed—to decide the case, and this proceeding was delayed by more than 
a month at Respondent’s request, even though Ms. counsel regularly communicated with the Attorney 
General’s office during her appeal to avoid just such a delay.  If Ms.  had pursued a separate Article 78 to 
obtain the documents, this appeal would likely not be heard and resolved before she would be entitled to a new 
hearing.  Such an outcome completely undermines a meaningful right of appeal.  See Kellogg v. N.Y. State Bd. of 
Parole, 160366/2016, NYLJ 1202783795915, at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., March 20, 2017) (Engoron, J.) (“Often, 
[ordering a new interview] is meaningless, or close to it, because with the passage of time, the inmate would have 
been entitled to a new hearing regardless.”). 







incomplete information and hope for the best.  On the other hand, the Board is effectively 
insulated from meaningful judicial review of its decisions.21  See Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 39 Misc. 3d 1213(A) (Sup. Ct. Col. Cty. 2013) (criticizing the Board 
for encouraging delay to “shield[] it[self] from judicial scrutiny”).22 
B. The Board’s Overbroad Definition of Confidentiality Does Not Permit Denial of 
Access To the Records 
Apparently anticipating that its “ain’t my fault” excuse will be rejected, the Board next 
argues Ms.  was not entitled to the documents in any event.  It is undisputed that Ms.  
properly requested, and is entitled to all records the Board considered in deciding her 
application, subject only to a few specific carveouts, see 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2), which 
must be read narrowly.  Zuckerman v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 53 A.D.2d 405, 407-08 (3d Dep’t 
1976) (“[S]tatutory exemption from disclosure must be narrowly construed to allow maximum 
access.”).  Though the documents Respondent declined to produce (which were virtually all of 
the documents requested) were withheld in their entirety, the statute permits withholding only the 
“name and address” of a letter’s author.  N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(c)(B).23  It does not permit 
blanket denial of the records if they can be redacted.  While Respondent claims its interpretation 
                                                 
21 In practice, it is invariably common for parole appeals to take so long that they are moot by the time any 
meaningful relief is obtained.  See Newton v. Dennison, 47 A.D.3d 538 (1st Dep’t 2008); Schwartz v. Dennison, 40 
A.D.3d 218 (1st Dep’t 2007); Siao-Pao v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 150 (1st Dep’t 2004); Boddie v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 290 A.D.2d 327, (1st Dep’t 2002); Patterson v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 298 A.D.2d 254, 254 (1st Dep’t 
2002); Feneque v. N.Y.State Div. of Parole, 252 A.D.2d 469, 471 (1st Dep’t 1998) (“In many ways, this procedural 
impasse leads to a frustrating outcome for an appellate tribunal and, of course, far more so for petitioner himself.”). 
22 Indeed, when Ms  counsel inquired why there was such a lengthy delay, the DOCCS Records Access 
Officer blamed the Parole Board for not acting more quickly when it knew appeal would be taken.  Vol. II at 117.  
This blame-shifting on both sides underscores how difficult the Board makes appeal of its decisions. 
23 Respondent states that letters were withheld pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a)(3), because they might 
result in harm to a person.  But that justification was never raised by the Administrative Appeal Unit (App. 205-06), 
nor by DOCCS (App. 440 (invoking only 259-i(2)(c)(B)), and so should not be considered.  See n.9, supra.  
Respondent makes no effort to explain why individuals are in danger of being harmed, and cannot rely on the 
theoretical possibility of harm to support a blanket record denial. 
 







is owed deference, Resp. Br. 43, n.14, the question is a matter of pure statutory interpretation, 
and requires no “special competence or expertise.”  Rho v. Ambach, 546 N.E.2d 188, 189 (1989) 
(citation omitted).  A court can easily interpret the term “name and address” as precluding 
withholding of documents in their entirety.  Resp. Br. 43, n.14.   
Respondent attempts to circumvent this issue by asserting that the “name and address” 
language of § 259-i(2)(c)(B)) must be read in conjunction with the parole regulation which 
describes a goal to “permit private citizens to express freely their opinions for or against an 
individual’s parole.”  9 N.Y.C.R.R § 8000.5(c)(2)(i).  But this neither permits the Board to be 
extraordinarily over-inclusive and withhold all documents, nor to treat a general goal described 
in a regulation as overriding a specific statutory command.  Perry Thompson Third Co. v. City of 
New York, 279 A.D.2d 108, 115 (1st Dep’t 2000) (“An administrative agency . . . cannot extend 
the meaning of the statutory language to apply to circumstances not intended to fall within the 
statute.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).  Redacting the name and address does 
not endanger the ability of people to freely express their opinions to the Board.   
Respondent then attempts to justify its withholding of documents by asserting that 
authors could be identified by virtue of writing style or personal information contained in the 
submission, which could embarrass them.  This reasoning was specifically rejected by the Third 
Department in Legal Aid Soc’y of Ne. N.Y., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 195 A.D.2d 
150, 153 (3d Dep’t 1993) (finding the idea that “an individual intent on discovering the 
particulars” may be able to identify and “embarrass or harass the applicant or recipient” of the 
requested determination to be “unpersuasive”).  Here, Respondent offers no support for its 
arbitrary speculation about what could happen if document access was provided.  Moreover, 
Respondent effectively contends that Ms.  is subject to less protection under the law 





because her parole application is the subject of media attention. See Resp. Br. 42. Theoretical 
concerns, especially those that can be cured by additional redactions to specific documents if 
necessaiy, cannot oveITide Ms. - undisputed right of access to the documents that served 
as a fundamental basis for the denial of her parole. 
The Board argues that Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A D .2d 725 (3d Dep 't 1982) justifies 
blanket withholding. It does not. That Comi never considered the issue of providing redacted 
letters, as Ms. - seeks here. Moreover, there was no indication in Jordan that the Board 
documents at issue played a significant impact in denying release. Here, "meaningful judicial 
review" requires considering the letters' content "to detennine if the actions of the Board were, 
in fact, in accordance with law." Collins v. Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 733 (4th Dep't 1983). 
Additionally, Jordan's reasoning is outdated because while it may have made sense at a time, the 
advent of the internet, online petitions (which were undisputedly used here), and the ability for 
lai·ge groups to mobilize against release with no real effo1i greatly minimize the risks of 
providing redacted letters. Modem cases, like Ruzas, have reached the conclusion is that 
redacted subinissions must be produced. Ruzas II, at 10 ("[S]ubrnissions to the Board "are not to 
remain confidential. Rather, only the names and addresses are to remain confidential, not the 
substance of the letters." (emphasis added)). 
Failure to produce the requested documents with redactions requires a de novo hearing. 
When the Boai·d relies on inappropriate materials, its decision must be annulled.24 For instance, 
24 Respondent fails to respond to the argument (Pet'r Br. 37, n . 24) that the list of letters in opposition and suppo1t 
(App. 578-82) provided is incomplete, because it omits numerous letters Petitioner believes to have been submitted 
to the Board on her behalf. Petitioner is entitled to review the record to ensure that all the documents of which she 
was a.ware were in fact reviewed by the Board. To the extent the Board was not provided with or did not consider 
all of the letters appropriately submitted on Ms. - s behalf, especially from those who know her personally, the 
Board's decision was improper and must be rev~ Smith v. N. Y. State Bd. of Parole, 34 A.D.3d 1156, 1157 (3d 
Dep't 2006) (reliance on en-oneous record wairnnts de novo interview); Hughes v. N. Y. State Div. of Parole, 21 
A.D.3d 1176, 1177 (3d Dep't 2005) (same); Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800, 801, (3d Dep't 2004) (same). 
23 




as noted supra at pp. 11-14, reliance on penal philosophy contained in the letters is inappropriate 
and a basis to grant a de novo interview.  Ramirez, at 3 (consideration of “letters from third 
parties expressing their penal philosophies” “improperly injected penal philosophy in rendering 
the challenged determination”); Ruzas I, at 5-6.  Moreover, the Board’s violation of its own 
regulations is itself a sufficient reason to warrant a de novo parole hearing.  Andrews v. N.Y. 
State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, No. 400897/2014 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Jan. 13, 2015) 
(Schlesinger, J.) (Board violated its rules by “denying Ms. Andrews access to records in her file 
that were considered by the Board but not provided to her in whole or in part.”).  Respondent 
does not deny that the documents formed a key part of the reason to deny parole, nor could it, 
given that the Board wrote that it was “persuaded” against release by the “boxes of opposition” 
contained in the requested documents.  App. 195-96.  In addition, the Board claimed that Ms. 
 must convince unnamed parties that she was fit for release.  App. 196.  Moreover, the 
Board distinguished its conclusion in denying parole from Governor Cuomo’s grant of clemency 
on the basis of “substantial additional information” it had received by virtue of its “unique 
process” beyond what was available to him.  App. 196.25  Therefore, the content of the letters is 
crucial to determining if the Board abused its authority. 
                                                 
25 Respondent’s argument that there is no due process interest in parole or her parole file, even if correct, is 
immaterial, because there is a liberty interest implicated—and a new hearing owed—when an agency does not 
follow its own regulations.  Id.; cf. Rodriguez v. Greenfield, 7 Fed. App’x 42, 44 (2d Cir.2001) (unpublished) 
(noting that there may be a “liberty or property interest in having the Parole Board comply with its own statutory 
and regulatory guidelines in determining whether to grant or deny parole”); cf. Graziano v. Pataki, No. 06CIV0480 
CLB, 2006 WL 2023082, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2006) (“[T]his Court concludes as a matter of law that there is an 
entitlement to a process of decision-making, which comports with the statutory guidelines of consideration to all 
relevant statutory factors”). 








For the foregoing reasons, this Court should vacate the Parole Board’s denial of parole 
and order an immediate de novo hearing before a new panel of Commissioners, with all 
documents previously before the Parole Board immediately produced, and only identifying 
names and addresses of the authors of those documents redacted. 
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